Ghana is preparing to fundamentally reshape the management of its natural resource revenues, with the government proposing a comprehensive Natural Resource Revenue Management Act to replace the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815), as amended, and bring revenues from gold, lithium, bauxite and other extractive resources under a unified statutory framework.
The proposed legislation, announced by Finance Minister Dr Cassiel Ato Forson during the presentation of the 2027 Budget Statement to Parliament on Thursday, November 12, 2026, signals a major policy shift from an oil-focused revenue management framework towards an integrated system covering the country’s wider petroleum and mineral wealth.
Under the proposal, revenues generated from oil, gold, lithium, bauxite and other extractive resources will be brought under one clear and accountable framework, with the stated objective of ensuring that natural resource wealth benefits both present and future generations.
However, beyond the promise of consolidating revenue streams, the proposed reform raises an important institutional question: will Ghana extend the independent public oversight model established under the PRMA to the mining sector, and strengthen the powers and resources available to ensure that recommendations translate into action?
The experience of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), established under the existing petroleum revenue law, offers an important benchmark.
How the PRMA framework works — and where PIAC fits
Enacted in 2011 and amended in 2015, the PRMA provides the legal framework for collecting, allocating, managing and reporting petroleum revenues. It establishes the Petroleum Holding Fund as the main account into which petroleum receipts due the state are paid, before allocations are made in accordance with statutory requirements.
The framework provides for transfers to the national oil company, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), and the Ghana Petroleum Funds. The latter comprise the Ghana Stabilisation Fund, intended to cushion public expenditure against unexpected petroleum revenue shortfalls, and the Ghana Heritage Fund, established to preserve part of the country’s petroleum wealth for future generations.
The law also establishes PIAC under Section 51 as a citizen-led public accountability institution. Its three principal responsibilities are to monitor and evaluate government and institutional compliance with the Act; provide a platform for citizens to debate whether petroleum revenue management and spending reflect national development priorities; and provide independent assessments to Parliament and the Executive to support their oversight responsibilities.
Under Section 56, PIAC is required to publish semi-annual and annual reports, submit them to the President and Parliament, and engage the public on its findings. Its role is therefore not to manage petroleum revenues or directly prosecute institutions, but to provide independent scrutiny, generate credible public information and strengthen citizens’ participation in resource governance.
This institutional arrangement is particularly relevant to the proposed Natural Resource Revenue Management Act. If the new law is to cover revenues from mining as well as petroleum, the accountability architecture must also address the collection, allocation, investment and utilisation of mineral revenues.
PIAC’s record: transparency gains, but enforcement gaps remain
Since its inauguration on September 15, 2011, PIAC has become an important source of independent information on Ghana’s petroleum revenue management.
Through its statutory reports, the Committee has tracked petroleum production, crude oil liftings, revenue receipts, statutory allocations, expenditure under the ABFA and the performance of the Ghana Stabilisation and Heritage Funds. Its public engagements and project inspections have also brought petroleum revenue management discussions beyond Accra and into communities.
PIAC’s published history records public forums in regional capitals, engagements in 123 districts and the inspection of more than 120 ABFA-funded projects between 2016 and 2019. By the publication of its 2024 Annual Report in April 2025, the Committee had issued 27 statutory reports, providing a substantial body of information for parliamentary scrutiny, policy debate, research and public accountability.
Yet, the record also exposes a persistent weakness: the production of reports and recommendations does not necessarily guarantee compliance or corrective action.
PIAC’s 2024 Annual Report disclosed that it had made 79 recommendations since its establishment, of which only 26, representing 33 per cent, had been implemented by the relevant institutions as at December 2024. The figure raises questions about the responsiveness of state institutions and the extent to which independent oversight findings influence administrative decisions and public expenditure.
More recent developments reinforce the concern. In its 2026 Semi-Annual Report, covering January to June 2026, PIAC reported that it could not include a chapter assessing the utilisation of petroleum revenues because the Ministry of Finance had not provided the requested information.
The omission is significant. It demonstrates that even where the law establishes reporting and oversight obligations, the effectiveness of independent scrutiny can be constrained by the availability and timely disclosure of information by the institutions being monitored.
PIAC has also raised concerns about its own institutional capacity. Following the 2025 amendment to the PRMA, its approved GH¢4.6 million for programmes and activities in that year represented only 21.43 per cent of its total budget, according to the Committee’s 2025 Semi-Annual Report. The funding reduction, PIAC said, had significantly limited its ability to execute its mandate.
These experiences offer important lessons for the proposed legislation: an oversight institution must have not only a statutory mandate but also guaranteed resources, access to information and effective mechanisms for securing responses to its findings.
Extending accountability beyond petroleum
The proposed law could address a significant gap in Ghana’s natural resource governance architecture by creating a common statutory framework for revenues from oil, gold, lithium, bauxite and other extractive resources.
Ghana’s extractive economy is no longer defined by petroleum alone. Gold remains a major source of export earnings, while manganese, bauxite and emerging lithium prospects present opportunities for industrial development, foreign exchange generation and employment.
Bringing these revenue streams under one framework could improve fiscal coordination, transparency and public reporting. It could also make it easier for Parliament and citizens to assess how much the country earns from its natural resources, how those revenues are allocated and whether they are being used in accordance with national development priorities.
Crucially, the legislation should clarify whether PIAC’s mandate will be expanded to cover mineral revenues or whether a separate independent institution will be established for that purpose. Extending PIAC’s responsibilities could build on an existing institutional structure and accumulated experience. However, such an expansion would require additional technical capacity, funding and expertise in mining royalties, mineral taxation, state equity interests and other mining-related revenue streams.
The new law should also clearly define the relationship between the oversight institution, the Ministry of Finance, the Ghana Revenue Authority, the Minerals Income Investment Fund and other agencies responsible for collecting, managing and investing resource revenues.
Infrastructure financing and the intergenerational wealth question
Another important element of the proposal is the government’s intention to direct natural resource revenues towards major national infrastructure projects.
Dr Forson indicated that the government would build on the experience of using petroleum revenues and mineral royalties to finance the Accra-Kumasi Expressway, with natural resource revenues subsequently directed towards major national infrastructure investments.
The approach presents an opportunity to convert finite natural resource wealth into productive assets that can generate economic and social benefits long after the minerals have been exhausted.
Investments in roads, railways, energy infrastructure and other strategic assets could improve transportation, reduce the cost of doing business, facilitate mineral processing and strengthen the productive capacity of the economy.
The proposed Western Corridor Railway, linking Takoradi through Nsuta and Awaso to Nyinahin, illustrates this development rationale. The project is expected to support the transportation of manganese and bauxite to processing facilities, strengthening Ghana’s ambition to retain more mineral value domestically.
However, the commitment to infrastructure financing must not undermine the principles of savings and economic stabilisation. A framework that channels too much resource revenue into infrastructure without adequate safeguards could expose public finances to commodity price volatility and leave insufficient reserves to cushion the economy during downturns.
The new law must therefore establish clear rules for balancing infrastructure expenditure, stabilisation savings and investments for future generations. It should also provide transparent criteria for selecting projects, independent appraisal, competitive procurement and public reporting on project costs and outcomes.
The test is whether the new law strengthens accountability
The proposed Natural Resource Revenue Management Act offers Ghana an opportunity to build a more comprehensive and forward-looking framework for managing its extractive wealth. But its success will depend as much on the strength of its accountability institutions as on the breadth of its revenue coverage.
PIAC’s nearly 15-year experience demonstrates the value of independent monitoring, public reporting, citizen engagement and evidence-based scrutiny. It has helped establish a public record of petroleum revenue receipts and utilisation, identified weaknesses in statutory compliance and provided Parliament and citizens with information to question how the country’s oil wealth is managed.
At the same time, the low implementation rate of its recommendations, funding constraints and difficulties obtaining information from state institutions expose weaknesses that the proposed reform should not reproduce.
Parliament must therefore pay particular attention to the proposed law’s provisions on independent oversight, access to information, funding security, publication of reports and institutional responses to recommendations. Consideration should also be given to formal mechanisms for referring suspected breaches to the appropriate investigative and enforcement bodies.
Ultimately, the reform should go beyond bringing gold, oil, lithium and bauxite revenues under one law. It must establish a system that ensures resource receipts are properly accounted for, strategically invested and translated into measurable development outcomes.
Ghana’s next chapter of resource governance should not be judged simply by how much revenue the country earns from extraction, but by how effectively it protects that wealth, holds institutions accountable and converts non-renewable resources into lasting prosperity for present and future generations.
By: Christian Kpesese
