The decision by private legal practitioner and Editor of the Daily Searchlight newspaper, Kenneth Kwabena Agyei Kuranchie, to invoke the original jurisdiction of Ghana’s Supreme Court for an interpretation of Article 66(2) of the 1992 Constitution has reopened an important constitutional debate that has largely remained unsettled since the advent of the Fourth Republic.
At issue is whether Ghana’s Constitution imposes an absolute lifetime bar on anyone who has served two presidential terms, or whether it simply limits a sitting President from seeking re-election beyond two consecutive terms in one continuous tenure.
The distinction is significant and goes to the very heart of constitutional interpretation.
While the public debate has quickly assumed political overtones, the question before the Supreme Court is fundamentally a legal one. It is not about creating new constitutional rights or removing presidential term limits. Rather, it concerns the true meaning of the language deliberately chosen by the framers of the 1992 Constitution.
The Constitution Is Deliberate in Its Language
Constitutions are not drafted casually. Every word is carefully chosen, and every omission is often just as significant as every inclusion.
A proper interpretation of Article 66 requires that it be read not in isolation but within the context of the entire constitutional framework governing the Presidency.
Throughout Chapter Eight of the Constitution, the framers consistently refer to “the President.” The chapter regulates the election, powers, responsibilities, tenure, removal and succession of the President—that is, the individual who currently occupies the constitutional office.
The Constitution in this context does not regulate the political future of an individual who once served as President except where it expressly says so.
This distinction matters
The office of President is a constitutional institution. The individual who occupies that office changes from time to time. Once a President leaves office, whether by completing a term, losing an election or otherwise, the constitutional powers and responsibilities attached to that office cease until that individual is again elected President.
The Constitution therefore regulates the office and its continuous occupation, not the biography of the individual.
Presidential Tenure Contemplates Consecutive Service
The concept of a “first term” and a “second term” naturally arises in the context of an incumbent President seeking re-election.
Indeed, Article 66 was enacted to prevent the concentration of executive authority by ensuring that a sitting President cannot continue in office indefinitely through repeated re-election.
The constitutional limitation is directed at the continuity of executive power.
It follows that where a President serves a term, leaves office following an electoral defeat or otherwise ceases to hold office, and later returns through a fresh electoral mandate, the constitutional circumstances are materially different from those of a sitting President seeking an immediate third consecutive term.
The interruption is not merely political; it is constitutional.
During that period, another person occupies the presidency, exercises executive authority and becomes the President under the Constitution.
To suggest that the interrupted term permanently follows the individual regardless of any break in constitutional service raises a question that the Constitution itself does not expressly answer.
That is precisely the question now before the Supreme Court.
What Kenneth Kuranchie’s Suit Seeks
The action filed by Kenneth Kwabena Agyei Kuranchie does not seek to abolish presidential term limits.
Neither does it seek to allow Presidents to remain in office indefinitely.
Rather, it asks the Supreme Court to interpret whether Article 66(2) should be understood as preventing a sitting President from serving beyond two consecutive terms, or whether it creates a permanent lifetime disqualification even where presidential service has been interrupted.
It is a question of constitutional interpretation.
The Constitution expressly provides the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction to determine disputes concerning the interpretation and enforcement of its provisions.
Seeking judicial clarification on an ambiguous constitutional question is therefore not unusual. It is precisely one of the constitutional responsibilities entrusted to the country’s highest court.
Responding to Gabby Otchere-Darko’s Argument
Lawyer Gabby Otchere-Darko has criticised the interpretation advanced in the suit, arguing that if the Constitution is read as imposing only a limit on consecutive terms, a President could repeatedly return to office after interruptions, thereby defeating the purpose of presidential term limits.
He argues that such an interpretation effectively resets the constitutional clock each time a President loses an election.
His concern is understandable because constitutions should not ordinarily be interpreted in ways that permit abuse of executive power.
However, that argument also assumes something that the Constitution itself does not expressly state.
Gabby Otchere-Darko argues that because the Constitution does not use the word “consecutive,” the Court cannot read that qualification into Article 66(2).
Yet the converse is equally true.
The Constitution also does not state that an individual who once served as President remains permanently disqualified after interrupted service.
It nowhere says that non-consecutive terms must automatically be added together regardless of the constitutional interruption created by another presidency.
In other words, both sides rely on implications drawn from constitutional language rather than on an express provision.
The issue therefore cannot be resolved merely by pointing to the absence of the word “consecutive.”
Instead, the Court must determine whether the constitutional references to “the President” are directed at regulating continuous occupancy of the office or imposing a permanent disability on the individual who once occupied it.
The Constitution Speaks of “The President”
One of the strongest textual arguments supporting the request for interpretation is the Constitution’s deliberate use of the term “the President.”
Chapter Eight repeatedly regulates what the President may do, how the President is elected, how the President vacates office and how the President exercises executive authority.
Those provisions are directed at the office-holder during a particular constitutional tenure.
They do not repeatedly refer to “a person who has at any time been President.”
That distinction cannot simply be ignored.
If the framers intended to create a permanent constitutional disability against any individual who had previously served two interrupted terms, they could have said so in unmistakable language.
Constitutions routinely impose lifetime disqualifications where that is their intention.
The absence of such express wording invites interpretation rather than assumption.
Constitutional Interpretation Must Follow the Text
Courts do not rewrite constitutions merely because they interpret provisions whose meaning is disputed.
On the contrary, constitutional adjudication exists precisely because constitutional language occasionally admits more than one plausible interpretation.
The Supreme Court’s duty is therefore not to decide what rule appears politically preferable.
Its responsibility is to determine what the Constitution actually means.
That exercise requires consideration of the constitutional text, the structure of Chapter Eight, the purpose of presidential term limits and the intention that can reasonably be inferred from the constitutional scheme as a whole.
A Defining Constitutional Question
Whatever conclusion the Supreme Court ultimately reaches, its decision will become one of the most important constitutional precedents on presidential tenure under the Fourth Republic.
The case is not about extending presidential power or weakening constitutional safeguards.
It is about answering a genuine constitutional question: Does Article 66(2) regulate the continuous tenure of a sitting President, or does it permanently bar an individual who once held office after two interrupted terms?
That question deserves careful judicial consideration free from partisan interpretation.
Ultimately, constitutional certainty is achieved not through political rhetoric but through authoritative judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court’s decision will therefore provide much-needed clarity on a provision whose implications have long been debated but never conclusively settled, strengthening Ghana’s constitutional democracy and enriching its jurisprudence on presidential tenure.
By: Christian Kpesese
