Ghana’s decision to centralise gold purchasing and exports through the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) was an ambitious economic intervention. The Board was mandated to formalise artisanal gold trading, stem smuggling and strengthen foreign exchange inflows. The institution has rapidly become a key pillar of the country’s macroeconomic stabilisation strategy.
Yet barely a year after its establishment, GoldBod is now at the centre of an intense policy debate – one that raises uncomfortable questions not only about transparency but also financial sustainability and the hidden costs of currency management.
The controversy is whether the role of the Board in gold aggregation and foreign exchange intervention is generating long-term value or quietly eroding its own financials.
GoldBod was created in 2025 to harmonise domestic gold buying, assaying and exports, particularly within the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector. The policy logic was straightforward. That is: bring informal gold flows into the official system, boost export receipts and expand the pool of foreign exchange available to the Bank of Ghana.
On the surface, the strategy appears to be delivering results. Official figures point to strong gold export volumes and sizable inflows that have supported external buffers at a time of tight global financing conditions. Government officials frequently cite the operations of GoldBod as a critical support for cedi stability.
In context, the Board aggregated a total of 26,153.98 kilograms of gold from the ASM sector in Q3 of 2025 . The gold, was valued at approximately US$2.76 billion. In the same quarter though, gold exports hit US$5.1 billion.
Again, GoldBod posted a strong GH¢691.14 million in total revenue during the same period. It had spent GH¢53.98 million during the period, leaving a net comprehensive income of GH¢637.39 million. The Board ended the quarter with cash and bank balances of GH¢1.12 billion. Just so you know, the Board has so far also recovered ¢3m from illegal gold trade.
However, analysts caution that headline numbers alone do not capture the full financial picture.
Cost of currency stabilisation
A recent policy analysis by Bright Simons of the IMANI Centre for Policy and Education shifts attention from gross export receipts to net financial outcomes. The main concern is the pricing structure underpinning GoldBod’s gold purchases and subsequent sales particularly where these transactions intersect with the Bank of Ghana’s foreign exchange operations.
According to IMF assessments referenced in the analysis, Ghana incurred an estimated US$214 million gap in gold-related transactions linked to foreign exchange intervention activities. While not explicitly labelled as a GoldBod loss, the figure signals the economic cost of selling foreign exchange at below-market rates to stabilise the cedi with gold purchases serving as the underlying source of FX supply.
Bright Simons for instance argues that when these intervention-related costs are effectively absorbed within the gold trading chain, they can steadily weaken the financial position of the entity facilitating the transactions.
Based on prevailing transaction volumes and pricing differentials, the analysis estimates that without structural adjustments or fiscal backing, the capital buffers of GoldBod could come under severe strain within months and potentially render the institution insolvent within a year.
The counter argument
GoldBod’s management strongly disputes this interpretation.
The board maintains that it is operating profitably and has recorded significant surpluses from its core commercial activities. According to the Chief Executive Officer of GoldBod, Sammy Gyamfi, the internal figures yet to be independently audited suggest an income surplus of at least GH¢600 million for the 2025 financial year.
Officials further argue that IMF-referenced losses relate to broader central bank programmes rather than GoldBod’s trading operations, insisting that conflating the two creates a misleading picture of the institution’s financial position.
This divergence exposes a fundamental challenge in public-sector finance: when commercial entities are used as instruments of macroeconomic policy, distinguishing between operational performance and policy-induced costs becomes increasingly complex.
Transparency as the missing link
Economists following the debate say the disagreement cannot be resolved through statements alone. Instead, they point to the absence of publicly available, audited financial accounts that clearly reconcile gold purchase prices, export revenues, intervention-related pricing decisions and any quasi-fiscal obligations borne by GoldBod.
Without such disclosure, both narratives they say remain plausible and unverifiable.
“The earlier statement [from GoldBod] came across as defiant. But now the position seems to be that yes, there are losses, and the benefits outweigh the costs. That is a point of view. This is for the country of Ghana. When institutions of state are doing things and people comment, it’s not necessarily an attack”, says Patrick Asuming, Professor of Finance at the University of Ghana Business School.
For investors and development partners, the lack of clarity carries reputational and policy risks. GoldBod is not merely another state enterprise; it sits at the intersection of commodity exports, currency stability and fiscal credibility. Any uncertainty around its financial footing could complicate the broader recovery under the IMF-supported programme.
What lies ahead
If gold market interventions remain key to currency management, policymakers may need to explicitly recognise and fund the associated costs rather than allowing them to accumulate implicitly within a commercial entity.
Alternatively, operational reforms such as revised pricing mechanisms or clearer separation between commercial trading and policy intervention could help safeguard the balance sheet of GoldBod.
What is increasingly clear is that export volumes alone are no longer sufficient to assess success. The sustainability of the country’s gold strategy will largely depend on whether the institutions executing it can remain financially viable, transparent and insulated from unaccounted policy burdens.
For now, the operation of GoldBod is only a stark reminder that stabilisation, while necessary, is never cost-free.
Source: citinewsroom
